Well intervention: workover and pulling
This market does not depend on more wells being drilled: it lives off the stock of wells already producing, which is why it does not stop when drilling stops. That is some 4,300 producing wells that need maintenance throughout their working life, plus refracturing of the older horizontals. It is also the lowest capital-barrier segment in Vaca Muerta — a self-propelled rig costs on the order of USD 0.9-1.5 M — and the one where Neuquén's local-content floor weighs most, already channelling close to 46% of contracted value to certified Neuquén suppliers. ⚠️ What the price of the rig does not show: the collective agreement sets the minimum crew per shift, and a year of payroll comes close to what the rig costs to buy.
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What the market is made of
The TAM of the full intervention segment breaks down into three legs with opposite dynamics. The addressable crack is the SME-fragmented block (workover + pulling); the coiled tubing and the primary-frac wireline/snubbing are mostly majors' and equipment-niche territory.
The CT/wireline/snubbing of the primary frac (the large fracturing companies, and in snubbing the largest operator's services arm) is equipment-niche territory, captive. It is not the entry point. estim
Addressable: light SME pulling/workover over ~4,300 producing wells (low capital barrier, real fragmentation) + long-reach CT for drill-out (bottleneck: lack of CT in the country) + 2nd snubbing operator. estim
An SME with 4-8 certified pulling rigs (model of the local SMEs already operating) or long-reach CT takes a share; ~46% of the amount contracted in H2-2025 already went to Neuquén SMEs. estim
Why we do not put a number on it The size of what can be captured comes from rigs times day rate times days worked, and the day rate for an intervention rig is not published in Argentina. What can be said, and is more useful, is in the entry map: the rig costs on the order of USD 0.9-1.5 M, but the payroll the collective agreement requires to run it around the clock comes close to that same figure every year. Publishing a wedge would mean multiplying three chained assumptions.
Who really pays?
The obvious name is not always the client, and intervention procurement is not uniform: YPF self-supplies via its services arm, the other operators outsource, and there is a layer of subcontracting from the big fleet players. The different doors of the money flow:
That the operators without their own arm contract rigs under framework agreements is not something we found in an open source unconf. That YPF supplies itself mainly through its services arm, and that the direct door for third parties is the operators without their own arm, is our own reading thesis.
The big fleet players win the framework agreement with the operator and subcontract SME rigs/crews.
Same firms that dominate fracturing — equipment-niche territory; the owner usually reserves the purchase of the critical completion service.
According to the press from 2021 and 2022, only the largest operator's services arm has a unit —the only one in Latin America— and it cost it between USD 18 and 20M prob. A second operator would need a guaranteed-payment contract with an operator other than the one that already has a unit to amortise the equipment thesis.
Which projects move this demand
The RIGI's first oil upstream project. Adhesion on 25-Jun-2026 (Acta 23 of the Comité Evaluador) and approval by Resolución 1025/2026…
see the project →Development of the asset Pluspetrol bought from ExxonMobil. Peak of 100,000 bbl/d + 12 MMm3/d, +600 wells. Includes GyP's 10% carry.
see the project →YPF mega-development: plateau of 240,000 bbl/d in 2032, 1,152 wells. A signal of the scale jump in Neuquén upstream leveraged on already-secured…
see the project →When the window opens
This market does not follow the pace of drilling: it follows the pace of the well already producing. It was visible between 2024 and 2026: the basin's drilling rigs came down while production was breaking records and the stock of producing wells kept growing. What does have a date of its own is abandonment work: YPF is negotiating with the province the closure of up to 2,000 wells in two areas whose concessions expire in 2027, and that is rig work. These four indicators measure that, and the third has to be read the other way round from the rest of the sector.
The national leaders concentrate their fleet in Vaca Muerta and can saturate the segment. thesis
Workover lives off the producing stock + refracturing; if the focus stays 100% on new wells, the wave of intervening old wells is delayed. thesis
The opportunity in depth
The opportunity in depth
Low capital — light SME pulling/workover: with USD 0.9-1.5M you buy a self-transporting rig; demand is recurring and dispersed across ~4,300 producing wells and no player monopolizes it. Model already proven by local SMEs: one operates 4 rigs and announced it will double them to 8, and another has a light rig validated by INTI.
Higher margin — extended-reach coiled tubing and fast milling to clean out the plugs in every new well, on laterals that already exceed 4,000 metres prob. ⚠️ With one dated warning: this gap is closing. In August 2026 one of the large fracturing companies announced it is expanding its coiled tubing capacity in Argentina under a three-year committed contract, and another has been adding units. Anyone entering now competes against someone who has just signed.
The wave coming — refracturing: ~2,500 horizontal wells from 2015-2019 with obsolete completions; the pumping belongs to the big player, but the wireline/CT/workover around it belongs to this niche.
Second snubbing operator: according to the press in 2021 and 2022 there was a single unit in the country, operated by an operator's own services arm. For extra-long lateral wells, where coiled tubing buckles, it is the only alternative. ⚠️ But the figure has to be read carefully: a single unit may mean one is enough for the whole market —it does on the order of ten interventions a year— rather than that a second one is missing. The capital is high and the demand small: it is a bet on laterals continuing to lengthen, not a proven gap.
See the detail
When you get paid, and what blocks it
already in
split
National fleet >25 pulling + >20 workover + >35 drilling. Sold its San Jorge Gulf business (12 workover + 12 pulling, ~750 workers) to CONCENTRATE on Vaca Muerta; YPF mega-contract.
Largest rig fleet in the country (~155 nationwide). Auctioned ~10 rigs from the San Jorge Gulf in 2025 (ref. capex: pulling ~USD 0.9M, workover >USD 1.5M).
Brought from the U.S. a snubbing unit that has operated since 2021 for wells with >4,000 m laterals (the longest-lateral wells in the country) prob and, according to the press in 2021 and 2022, operates the only snubbing unit in Latin America prob. Gap = second snubbing operator.
Long-reach CT: 7,436 m with two service firms for YPF (January 2025) prob; the mark was surpassed in 2025 with 7,500 m (two service firms) and 8,340 m with the snubbing of YPF's services arm prob, plug-and-perf wireline. Same firms that dominate fracturing (equipment-niche territory). One adds 2 CT units; another entered wireline and refrac studies.
See the remaining player
One operates 4 pulling rigs and announced it will double them to 8; it has already imported a CRT from Canada. Another has an integrated light flush-by/pulling/workover rig (>45 interventions/month, INTI-validated). ~46% of the amount contracted by the industry in H2-2025 was absorbed by certified Neuquén suppliers (over a thousand companies on the register). It is the SME heart of the niche.
The jobs it createsThe SME heart of the oilfield: >800 Neuquén companies, employment for rig operators, mechanics and crew trades — the most distributed and local employment in the chain. thesis
calculate it
The number is our own estimate. The calculation, step by step, is below.
The full calculation, step by step
Concentration Fragmented with a long SME tail (the opposite of fracturing, which is a duopoly). Light pulling/workover has a low capital barrier and demand dispersed across ~4,300 wells: the most sme-friendly segment of the oilfield. Sub-segments that ARE concentrated: snubbing (de facto monopoly of the largest operator's services arm), long-reach CT and complex wireline (the large fracturing companies) — those belong to the equipment-niche territory.
The rule that moves it
The engine is the RIGI mega-developments; the entry lever, by contrast, is 100% provincial Neuquén (local content + investment regime).
See the underlying reading
The underlying policy that opens up this demand. It is the same inference declared by the rules and the program pillars pushing in this direction.
better export netbackWhere the number comes from
~USD 150-270M/year (the workover + pulling leg, the SME focus)
See the calculation, the variables and how it was validated
The workover + pulling leg —the SME focus— is built bottom-up from a few variables. The honesty caveat: the daily rig rate is not public in Argentina, so the result is a wide band, not a precision figure. Each variable carries its freshness stamp.
The coiled tubing leg is calculated differently (~500 new wells × USD 120-220k/well of drill-out) and is mostly equipment-niche / majors' territory; it does not enter this SME-focus formula.
The number rests on a few variables. The formula shows how it moves when each one changes; and each variable carries its freshness seal — how often it is worth revisiting. estim
We bound the number to the SME portion that does not overlap with frac equipment: workover and pulling over the base of ~4,300 producing wells, a verified figure. The scale of the local fabric too: 46% of the amount contracted in the second half of 2025 went to certified Neuquén suppliers. What keeps the number as a wide band rather than an exact figure is the daily rig rate: it is not public in Argentina, so we give a range instead of inventing the data.
Coverage: the public register of Certified Neuquén Suppliers, counted in full: 1,029 companies, of which 36 in the trade «Well drilling and well-specific services» · Sep 14, 2026 · not reviewed: in Neuquén there is no mandatory license to operate workover or pulling rigs, so there is no register of service providers; and the certified-suppliers one says who is certified, not who operates rigs
How to cite this figure: Despegue (2026). Well intervention: workover and pulling · Neuquén. despegueargentina.com/en/neuquen/intervencion-pozos-workover-pulling · terms of use
Neighbouring markets7 markets in the same group, from USD 25 to USD 3,500 M a year
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